Industry News

Wanker Wang (Inkyo Volt Hwang) 1997 Guilty Plea

Here’s the court transcript (it cost me $129 and it came in all capital letters):

THE COURT: I HAVE THE DEFENDANT’S SOCIAL HISTORY WITH ATTACHMENTS BRIEF FILED BY MR. EPSTEIN ON DECEMBER THE 5TH, WHICH I HAVE READ AND CONSIDERED, INCLUDING ALL OF THE ARTICLES AND ATTACHMENTS THERETO. I ALSO HAVE THE DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL SENTENCING MEMORANDUM WITH EXHIBITS, WHICH WAS FILED BY MR. EPSTEIN ON MR. HWANG’S BEHALF ON DECEMBER 18TH. AND THAT INCLUDES A STATEMENT FROM THE VICTIM IN THIS CASE, MISS NA, AS WELL AS TWO OTHER EXHIBITS, ALSO, THE INFORMATION AND DECLARATION FROM THE EXPERT, IF YOU WILL, DR. EDWARD CHANG, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF ETHNIC STUDIES AT U.C. RIVERSIDE.

I ALSO HAVE THE DEPUTY PROBATION OFFICER BRIDGE’S REPORT PREPARED FOR THE HEARING DATE ON DECEMBER THE 8TH FROM WHICH THIS MATTER WAS CONTINUED, INCLUDING ONE LATE ATTACHMENT THAT I DON’T KNOW IF EVERYBODY GOT. IT HAD TO DO WITH THE AMOUNT OF THE RESTITUTION. AND I HAVE READ AND CONSIDERED THAT.

I ALSO NOW, THIS MORNING, HAVE GOTTEN A XEROXED COPY OF THE RESTITUTION FIGURES FOR THE VICTIM, MS. NA, WHICH CORRESPONDS IN DOLLAR AMOUNT, $21,858.78, TO HER DECLARATION, WHICH IS EXHIBIT A TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL SENTENCING MEMORANDUM. I HAVE NO FURTHER WRITTEN MATERIAL FROM THE PEOPLE WITH RESPECT TO THE SENTENCING IN THIS MATTER.

I HAVE ALSO READ THE FILE, AND I HAVE ALSO CONSIDERED THE NEGOTIATED PLEA TAHL WAIVER FORM WHICH WAS EXECUTED ON OCTOBER THE 31ST, 1997, AND AGAIN, IN THIS SAME CASE, YA034228, TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT PLED NO CONTEST TO COUNT 1, A VIOLATION OF PENAL CODE SECTION 245(A)(1), ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON.

IN THIS CASE I AM ASSUMING THE SHOD FEET IS THE WEAPON; IS THAT CORRECT, MISS DIERINGER?

MS. DIERINGER: YES.

THE COURT: COUNT 7, VIOLATION OF PENAL CODE 3 1 SECTION 243.4. IS THAT — I’M TRYING TO READ THE FORM. IT LOOKS LIKE (A), 243.4(A); IS THAT CORRECT?

MS. DIERINGER: 243.4(A)

THE COURT: (C)?

MS. DIERINGER: (C), I’M SORRY. IT WAS STARTED OUT 7 AS (A), BUT BY INTERLINEATION MADE TO BE (C).

THE COURT: WHICH WAS AS A SEXUAL BATTERY. AND I ASSUME THAT WAS AS A FELONY, ALSO?

MS. DIERINGER: YES, IT WAS.

THE COURT: NOW, IN ADDITION, THE COURT HAS DONE SOME RESEARCH AS SUCH — NOT REALLY RESEARCH, BUT THE COURT EXPRESSED SOME VIEWS TO COUNSEL ON THIS MATTER AT THE PREVIOUS HEARING OF THIS MATTER OFF THE RECORD. AND THE COURT, JUST SO EVERYONE WILL KNOW, HAS DONE SOMEREADING AND SOME RESEARCH WITH RESPECT TO WHAT, IN FACT, IS — AND I AM LABELING THIS, THIS IS MY TERM — A CULTURAL DEFENSE TO THIS MATTER. AT LEAST IT APPEARS THAT’S WHAT IT IS.

THERE IS A JUDGE’S BENCH BOOK PUT OUT THAT DEALS WITH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE. AND THIS IS A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE.

MS. DIERINGER: YES.

THE COURT: THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT IT. IT ADMITS ALL THE CRITERIA. SO I WENT TO MY HANDY-DANDY LITTLE BOOK, AND I HAVE READ A LAW REVIEW ARTICLE WHICH I WILL CITE. IT’S WRITTEN BY NILDA RIMONTE, A QUESTION OF CULTURE: CULTURAL APPROVAL OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE PACIFIC-ASIAN COMMUNITY AND THE CULTURAL DEFENSE, STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 1311. IT’S A 1991 LAW REVIEW ARTICLE. AND I’VE DONE SOME OTHER RESEARCH ON THIS MATTER BECAUSE, QUITE FRANKLY, I WAS OFFENDED BY THE MEMORANDUM IN THE DEFENSE IN THIS CASE. I THINK IT’S LEGALLY REPUGNANT. I THINK IT’S ETHICALLY REPUGNANT. AND I JUST WANT TO LET THAT BE KNOWN RIGHT UP FRONT.

THE ENTIRE APPROACH, AS I READ IT, IN THIS CASE IS THAT THIS GENTLEMAN HAS GOT SOME PROBLEMS WITH I.N.S. AND IS A MEMBER OF THE KOREAN COMMUNITY AND, THEREFORE, THE COURT SHOULD SENTENCE DIFFERENTLY. THIS COURT WOULD NEVER DO THAT. AS SAID IN ALL OF THESE ARTICLES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CROSSES ALL ETHNIC GROUPS, BACKGROUNDS. AND I HAVE NO INTENTION OF SENTENCING THIS INDIVIDUAL BECAUSE HE IS OR IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE KOREAN COMMUNITY. THAT’S NOT A FACTOR IN SENTENCING. AND CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT, IN PARTICULAR, 421 AND 423, WHICH DEAL WITH WHAT THE COURT CAN LOOK TO IN SENTENCING IN AGGRAVATION AND MITIGATION — AND IN MITIGATION, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 15 FACTORS LISTED IN MITIGATION, NONE OF WHICH INCLUDES ETHNICITY AND NONE OF WHICH INCLUDES STATUS WITH I.N.S. IT’S SIMPLY NOT A FACTOR THAT ANY COURT COULD, SHOULD, AND I CERTAINLY NEVER WOULD, LOOK TO.

SO I’M NOT SURE WHAT THIS PROFESSOR AT U.C. RIVERSIDE IS TRYING TO TELL ME. BUT I’LL GIVE YOU SOME QUOTES FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND A FEW OTHER PLACES. BUT THAT IS NOT A FACTOR THAT THIS COURT SHOULD, COULD OR EVER WOULD, AGAIN, CONSIDER IN SENTENCING THIS INDIVIDUAL.

WHAT I HAVE TO LOOK TO ARE THE FACTORS THAT ARE SET OUT IN THE RULES OF COURT AND WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE, THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. AND QUITE FRANKLY — AND I WANT TO START WITH MS. DIERINGER. WHY THE FOUR-YEAR DEAL? I’M NOT SURE I’M GOING TO GO ALONG WITH IT. IT SHOULD BE MORE.

MS. DIERINGER: WELL, YOUR HONOR, I UNDERSTAND THE COURT’S VIEWPOINT, VERY MUCH SO. AND I MUST SAY THAT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE THE PEOPLE ARE TRYING TO BALANCE WHAT WE FEEL HAS BEEN A TERRIBLE HARM THAT’S BEEN PERPETRATED ON MS. NA AND MS. NA’S VIEWS WHERE — AND I’VE TOLD THIS TO HER MYSELF, THAT I FEEL THAT SHE IS IN MANY WAYS A TYPICAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIM WHO ACCEPTS A LOT OF ABUSE AND DOES NOT FEEL GOOD ABOUT HERSELF AND, THEREFORE, REALLY ALLOWS SOMEONE LIKE MR. HWANG TO TREAT HER IN THIS MANNER AND THEN STILL BELIEVES THE BEST IN HIM. AND I TOLD HER THAT’S VERY COMMENDABLE TO BE FORGIVING AND TO BELIEVE IN THE BEST OF PEOPLE, BUT MY JOB IS TO LOOK AND SEE WHAT HE’S DONE TO HER AND TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT HE IS A PERSON THAT’S GOING TO BE ABLE TO COMPLY WITH PROBATION OR WHO SHOULD BE RELEASED ON LESSER CHARGES. THIS IS A SITUATION WHERE —

THE COURT: WELL, THERE WERE ORIGINALLY SEVEN COUNTS IN THIS.

MS. DIERINGER: YES.

THE COURT: OBVIOUSLY, I WASN’T PART OF THE PLEA NEGOTIATIONS, AND I DON’T KNOW WHAT WENT ON. BUT THEY INCLUDED KIDNAPPING, TWO COUNTS OF RAPE, BATTERY, CONTEMPT OF COURT, PLUS THE TWO THAT HE PLED TO, THE ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON AND THE SEXUAL BATTERY.

MS. DIERINGER: RIGHT.

THE COURT: VERY SERIOUS CHARGES.

MS. DIERINGER: THEY ARE VERY SERIOUS CHARGES, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

MS. DIERINGER: WITH THE SITUATION THAT EXISTS, AS THE COURT CAN TELL FROM THE LETTER BY MISS NA, MISS NA IS STILL WILLING TO FORGIVE THE DEFENDANT FOR WHAT HE DID. SHE REALIZES HE DID SOMETHING WRONG TO HER, BUT SHE VERY MUCH IS PLEADING ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT FOR THE COURT TO CONSIDER THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES, ET CETERA. THIS IS THE SAME —

THE COURT: HOW DOES THE COURT HAVE THE RIGHT TO EVEN DO THAT?

MS. DIERINGER: I UNDERSTAND. I AGREE WITH THE COURT TOTALLY. THAT IS NOT A CONSIDERATION BECAUSE THAT, IN EFFECT, GIVES DEFENDANTS WITH IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES A BETTER DEAL THAN PERSONS WHO ARE CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE COURT: THAT’S AN ACT OF DISCRIMINATION TO EVEN SUGGEST THAT THE COURT SHOULD DO SOMETHING LIKE THAT.

MS. DIERINGER: I AGREE. I AGREE TOTALLY WITH THE COURT ABOUT THAT. I THINK IT’S AN IMPROPER CONSIDERATION.

THE COURT: ABSOLUTELY.

MS. DIERINGER: I AM SIMPLY PUTTING OUT TO THE COURT WE HAVE TO DEAL WITH OUR VICTIMS AS THEY ARE. SHE IS VERY SYMPATHETIC TO THE DEFENDANT. SHE IS A PERSON WHO EVEN IN HER TESTIMONY HAS INDICATED, “WELL, I DIDN’T WANT TO DO IT, BUT THEN I DIDN’T REALLY — YOU KNOW, HIT HIM HARD OR DO THESE DIFFERENT THINGS,” AND WAS KIND OF MITIGATING WHAT HE DID. AND IN TERMS OF HOW THAT COMES ACROSS TO A JURY, WE CONSIDERED THAT IN TERMS OF MAKING THIS DEAL. THAT’S WHY —

THE COURT: IS THE PROBATION OFFICER’S REPORT CONTAINED ON PAGES 2 THROUGH — LET’S SEE. IT’S VERY LENGTHY. I’M CLEAR UP TO PAGE 18.

MS. DIERINGER: YES.

THE COURT: 2 THROUGH 22 ARE THERE. TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE — AND SINCE, AGAIN, I WASN’T PART OF THIS BEFORE AND I ONLY HAVE THIS REPORT — ANY INACCURACIES? IT SEEMS TO BE A DIRECT STATEMENT FROM THE VICTIM —

MS. DIERINGER: RIGHT.

THE COURT: — AS TO WHAT OCCURRED, AMONG OTHER 8 THINGS, YOU KNOW, THE 5-FOOT-11, 180-POUND DEFENDANT, A 5-FOOT-3, 105-POUND VICTIM. HE WAS WEARING WORK BOOTS. HE KICKS HER IN THE HEAD, IN THE CROTCH, IN THE CHEST WHILE SHE’S DOWN, ET CETERA. THEN ALL THE OTHER INCIDENTS, INCLUDING THE MOTEL INCIDENTS AND ALL THIS, AND SHE’S SORE THREE DAYS AFTER.

WE HAVE WHAT? $20,000 OF WHICH A LARGE PORTION OF MEDICAL EXPENSES. THESE ARE OBVIOUSLY VERY SERIOUS INJURIES TO ALMOST HER ENTIRE BODY. THERE ARE THREATS. HAVE THE WEAPONS BEEN TURNED OVER YET?

MS. DIERINGER: THAT’S A SUBJECT I WAS GOING TO ADDRESS TO THE COURT. THIS, TOO —

THE COURT: THIS IS, YOU KNOW, PUNCH, KICK, THREATEN. I MEAN FRACTURED RIBS. YOU KNOW?

MS. DIERINGER: WELL, I HAVE NOT SEEN THE MEDICAL REPORTS SAYING THAT SHE HAS INDICATED SHE THOUGHT THERE WAS A FRACTURED RIB. IT WAS A KICK TO THE SIDE AND SHE WAS DOWN. THAT’S THE ONLY KICK THAT SHE TESTIFIED TO AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING. THE OTHERS WERE PUNCHES TO, BASICALLY, HER FACE AND GRABBING AREAS ON HER ARMS. AND WE DID HAVE PICTURES THAT BASICALLY SHOWED BRUISING —

THE COURT: WELL, THE OFFICER SAW THE WOUNDS;RIGHT?

MS. DIERINGER: CORRECT.

THE COURT: OKAY. THERE’S NOBODY —

MS. DIERINGER: I’M NOT TRYING TO MITIGATE IT. HE DID BEAT HER.

THE COURT: SEVERELY.

MS. DIERINGER: AND SHE WAS SORE. SHE DID NOT RECEIVE HOSPITALIZATION FOR HER WOUNDS. I JUST WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT, TOO.

THE COURT: YEAH.

MS. DIERINGER: AND THE ISSUE OF THE WEAPONS THAT THE COURT ADDRESSES IS SOMETHING THAT I HAVE MENTIONED TO DEFENSE COUNSEL AS A CONCERN OF MINE BECAUSE EVEN AFTER THE RESTRAINING ORDER WAS SECURED BY HER THERE WERE VIOLATIONS OF THE RESTRAINING ORDERS BY DEFENDANT CONTACTING HER, AND ALSO SENDING — WE DON’T KNOW IF HE SENT HER, BUT HIS MOTHER WENT AND ALSO THERE WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF HIS, JOHN CHOI, WHO WENT TO THE HOUSE AND TRIED TO BASICALLY, IN AN EFFORT — IT APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO GET THE VICTIM TO DROP THE CHARGES.

IN ADDITION, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 13 WEAPONS THAT WE HAD SHOWN THAT WERE REGISTERED TO THE DEFENDANT, AND WE HAD MADE THE POINT — WELL, PER THE RESTRAINING ORDER, HE IS REQUIRED TO TURN THESE WEAPONS IN. HE HAS NOT DONE SO WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THIS SHOTGUN WHICH IS A CUT-OFF SHOTGUN. IT’S BARELY WITHIN THE LEGAL LIMIT. IT WAS BROUGHT BY DETECTIVE FORD LAST TIME. I DON’T KNOW IF THE COURT SAW IT. HE WAS CARRYING THIS LARGE SHOTGUN.

THE COURT: NO. I DIDN’T SEE IT.

MS. DIERINGER: THAT IS THE ONLY ONE THAT’S BEEN TURNED IN TO MY KNOWLEDGE. I HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHATSOEVER OF ANY OTHER GUNS THAT WERE REGISTERED TO THE DEFENDANT. COUNSEL DID INDICATE TO ME THAT THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY THREE GUNS THAT WERE REGISTERED TO THE DEFENDANT THAT HIS PARENTS ARE USING BECAUSE THEY OWN A STORE IN COMPTON. THAT, TO ME, BELIES THE QUESTION BECAUSE THEY ARE REGISTERED TO THE DEFENDANT, AND HE SHOULD HAVE TURNED THOSE IN PURSUANT TO THE ORDER. AND WE ALSO MADE THAT CLEAR AT THE TIME OF THE PLEA, THAT HE NEEDED TO TURN THOSE IN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AND AS OF YET, THERE’S ONLY BEEN ONE OF THOSE GUNS TURNED IN. HIS PARENTS, IF THEY WANT GUNS, THEY SHOULD GET THEIR OWN GUNS AND HAVE THEM REGISTERED TO THEMSELVES FOR THE BUSINESS AND NOT BE VIOLATING THE ORDER WITH RESPECT TO TURNING AND SURRENDERING THE GUNS IN BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ALLOWED TO POSSESS ANY FIREARMS AS A CONVICTED FELON. SO WITH RESPECT TO THOSE ARE MY CONCERNS BECAUSE I HAVE BEEN EXPRESSING TO DEFENSE COUNSEL AND ALSO TO THE VICTIM, MISS NA, THAT I AM OPPOSED TO PROBATION. I BELIEVE THE DEFENDANT SHOULD GO TO STATE PRISON.

I FEEL THESE ARE VERY SERIOUS CHARGES. AND THE REASON FOR THE DISPOSITION, AS I MENTIONED TO THE COURT, WHICH WAS CLEARED THROUGH MY HEAD DEPUTY, WAS BASICALLY IN TERMS OF THE VICTIM’S TESTIMONY AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN WHICH —

THE COURT: BUT NOBODY’S DENIED THAT THESE INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE. WHAT YOU ARE SIMPLY SAYING AND WHAT I’M HEARING, IS MAYBE A BETTER WAY OF PUTTING IT, IS SHE, QUOTE-UNQUOTE, HAS FORGIVEN HIM FOR THIS VICIOUS ATTACK.

MS. DIERINGER: IT’S NOT JUST THAT, YOUR HONOR. IT’S JUST THAT IN TERMS OF PRESENTING TO —

THE COURT: ISN’T THAT TYPICAL OF DOMESTIC VICTIMS?

MS. DIERINGER: ABSOLUTELY, ABSOLUTELY. IT IS TYPICAL OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS. AND WE ARE DEALING HERE, THOUGH, WITH SITUATIONS IN TERMS OF — AS THE COURT NOTED, WITHIN THE KOREAN COMMUNITY, THERE ARE CERTAIN PRESSURES THAT CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR THAT CAN INFLUENCE WOMEN IN THAT COMMUNITY A LOT MORE STRONGLY THAN ANY TYPE OF THREAT OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE. YET, OUR LAW IS PRIMARILY GEARED TO —

THE COURT: WE’RE NOT IN KOREA.

MS. DIERINGER: I KNOW THAT. I REALIZE THAT.

AND I BELIEVE THAT THESE THREATS ARE JUST AS POTENT AS IF HE HAD HELD A GUN TO HER HEAD, BY THREATENING DISGRACE, BY THREATENING TO TELL PEOPLE IN THE KOREAN COMMUNITY THINGS ABOUT HER THAT HE KNEW WOULD BRING DISGRACE ON HER FAMILY, BY THREATENING TO TELL HER PARENTS, WHICH IN KOREA APPARENTLY PARENTS WOULD GO TO PARENTS AND THEN THEY TRY TO WASH THIS UNDER THE RUG.

THE COURT: LET ME GIVE YOU THE TERM FROM THE STANFORD LAW REVIEW ARTICLE. IT’S CALLED THE, QUOTE, “CODE OF SILENCE,” CLOSE QUOTE.

MS. DIERINGER: UH-HUH. AND I FIND THAT CODE OF SILENCE REPUGNANT, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: SO DOES THE COURT.

MS. DIERINGER: I BELIEVE — CERTAINLY, I WAS WILLING TO TAKE THIS THING TO TRIAL. BUT I WAS ALSO CONSIDERING THE INTERESTS OF THE VICTIM AND ALSO HAVING TO BE ABLE TO PRESENT TO, BASICALLY, JURORS WHO MAY NOT BE FAMILIAR WITH WHAT GOES ON IN KOREATOWN, EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES, OR AMONG THE KOREAN COMMUNITY, IN TERMS OF THE PRESSURES AND HOW POTENT THEY ARE AND UNDERSTANDING THOSE PRESSURES AND HOW SERIOUS THEY CAN BE. I WAS CONSIDERING THAT IN TERMS OF HOW THE JURORS WOULD BE ABLE — IF THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO UNDERSTAND SIGNIFICANTLY THAT KIND OF PRESSURE AND SHAME, WHICH MAY ONLY BE KOREAN. SO THOSE ARE THE FACTORS IN CONSIDERATION OF THAT. BUT I DO BELIEVE THIS IS A STATE PRISON CASE, AND I WILL BE REQUESTING THE COURT TO IMPOSE THE FULL TERM OF FOUR YEARS.

THE COURT: SO WHAT YOU ARE SAYING IS WITH RESPECT TO THE CHARGES YOUR OFFICE EITHER OFFERED OR ACCEPTED, AS THE CASE MAY HAVE BEEN, THIS FOUR-YEAR LID FOR THE PLEADING OF NO CONTEST TO COUNTS 1 AND 7, AND THAT YOU WENT ALONG WITH IT AS WELL AS YOUR SUPERIORS; IS THAT WHAT YOU ARE TELLING ME?

MS. DIERINGER: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 2

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, AT LEAST THAT ANSWERS THAT AS TO THAT PART OF IT. THERE WAS SOMEPLACE IN ONE OF THESE DOCUMENTS THAT I CAN’T FIND FOR THE MOMENT IN WHICH THERE’S JUST ANOTHER INCREDIBLE STATEMENT THAT THIS HAD SOMETHING — AND I WANT TO KNOW IF YOU HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THIS. I CAN’T FIND IT NOW. I THOUGHT I HAD MARKED IT. WHERE THIS HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT THE VICTIM AND THE DEFENDANT WERE THE ONLY TWO KOREAN-AMERICAN FAMILIES IN MANHATTAN BEACH.

MS. DIERINGER: I HAVE NOT BEEN —

THE COURT: DOES ANYBODY KNOW WHAT IN THE WORLD WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THERE?

MS. DIERINGER: — TOLD THAT. I DON’T KNOW. PERHAPS THAT QUESTION WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATELY ADDRESSED TO THE DEFENSE, YOUR HONOR, SINCE THAT’S IN THEIR DOCUMENT, IF THE COURT READ THIS THERE.

THE COURT: I’LL TELL YOU EXACTLY WHERE IT IS. IT’S IN THE SOCIAL HISTORY ON — AND SINCE THE PAGES AREN’T NUMBERED, IT’S IN THE — IT’S IN THE “INKYO’S RELATIONSHIP WITH HELEN NA” SECTION. I’LL READ IT, AND I’LL QUOTE IT VERBATIM: “INKYO HAD KNOWN HELEN NA SINCE JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL BUT ONLY AT A DISTANCE. THE HWANGS AND THE NA FAMILY AND TWO OR THREE OTHER KOREAN FAMILY COMPRISED THE ENTIRE KOREAN POPULATION” — THIS IS THE TOP OF PAGE 6. — “OF MANHATTAN BEACH,” ET CETERA, ET CETERA, ET CETERA. WHAT IN THE WORLD DOES THAT HAVE TO DO WITH ANY ISSUES THAT ARE BEFORE THE COURT IN SENTENCING THIS CASE? THAT’S REPUGNANT, AGAIN, TO USE MY FAVORITE WORD OF THE DAY. WHAT DOES THAT HAVE TO DO WITH THIS CASE? DO YOU HAVE ANY RESPONSE, OTHER THAN OBVIOUSLY THE COURT’S INDIGNATION THAT THIS INCREDIBLE DIATRIBE IN TWO VOLUMES, INCLUDING RETAINING — AND I ASSUME HIRING AND PAYING — A U.C. RIVERSIDE PROFESSOR TO TELL ME WHAT GOES ON IN THE KOREAN COMMUNITY? DOES THAT — MR. EPSTEIN, DOES DR. CHANG KNOW ANYTHING AT ALL ABOUT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE? DOES HE KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM?

MR. EPSTEIN: I CAN’T ANSWER THAT QUESTION, YOUR HONOR. I APOLOGIZE TO THE COURT. OBVIOUSLY, WE THOUGHT THE COURT WOULD —

THE COURT: WHAT? DO WHAT? GIVE HIM A BREAK BECAUSE HE’S KOREAN?

MR. EPSTEIN: NO.

THE COURT: THEN WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS — THIS REMARKABLE SET OF DOCUMENTS?

MR. EPSTEIN: PERSONALLY, I BELIEVE THAT — AND I WILL ARGUE TO THE COURT, THOUGH THE COURT OBVIOUSLY HAS VERY STRONG FEELINGS —

THE COURT: I HAVE VERY STRONG FEELINGS. MY FEELINGS ARE SO STRONG AND I’M EXPRESSING THEM THIS STRONGLY BECAUSE I FIND IT REMARKABLE THAT YOU WOULD FILE SUCH A THING. AND TO THINK THAT ANY COURT, ANY BENCH OFFICER WOULD SENTENCE SOMEONE BASED UPON ETHNICITY.

MR. EPSTEIN: WE ARE NOT ASKING THE COURT TO SENTENCE MY CLIENT, CERTAINLY, SOLELY ON ETHNICITY. ALL WE WERE DOING IS TRYING TO GIVE THE COURT AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE, OKAY, AS TO THE RAMIFICATIONS OF DIFFERENT SENTENCES.

THE COURT: IN THESE DOCUMENTS, CAN YOU POINT TO A SINGLE ARGUMENT OR A SINGLE SET OF FACTS THAT QUALIFY UNDER CALIFORNIA RULE OF COURT 423 FOR MITIGATION AND SENTENCING?

MR. EPSTEIN: I DON’T THINK THE COURT IS LIMITED UNDER THE LAW TO ONLY THOSE THINGS THAT ARE PUT DOWN IN THE RULES OF COURT. I MEAN, THE COURT IS ALLOWED TO TAKE IN ITS WHOLE LIFE OF EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE. I DON’T THINK THERE IS ANY LAW THAT SAYS THE COURT IS SOLELY LIMITED TO THE NARROW CONFINES OF THE RULES OF COURT IN MAKING A DECISION.

THE COURT: ISN’T IT A FACT WHEN THE COURT CONSIDERS PROBATION AND/OR WHETHER WE GO MID, LOW OR HIGH TERM THAT I AM REQUIRED BY LAW TO LOOK TO THE FACTORS THAT ARE ELICITED — EXCUSE ME — NOT ELICITED, BUT STATED IN CALIFORNIA RULE OF COURT 421 AND 423? ISN’T THAT WHAT THE SYSTEM DOES?

MR. EPSTEIN: I THINK FOR DETERMINING LOW, MIDDLE OR HIGH TERM, CERTAINLY.

THE COURT: AND PROBATION.

MR. EPSTEIN: YEAH. BUT I DON’T — YOU KNOW, MY VIEW IS THAT THE COURT CAN AND SHOULD TAKE IN EVERYTHING, AS MUCH KNOWLEDGE AS THE COURT POSSIBLY HAS IN ASITUATION. IF THE COURT FEELS THAT THIS — THAT THESE FACTORS ARE IRRELEVANT, THEN OBVIOUSLY THE COURT SHOULD NOT APPLY IT. BUT I DON’T —

THE COURT: IS A SERIOUS BEATING OF THIS VICTIM MITIGATED IN ANY WAY BY ANY OF THE MATERIAL THAT YOU PRESENTED TO ME?

MR. EPSTEIN: NO.

THE COURT: THEN WHY DID YOU PRESENT IT?

MR. EPSTEIN: BECAUSE I THOUGHT THAT THE COURT MIGHT CONSIDER THE HORRIFIC RAMIFICATION WHICH IS REALLY A MUCH MORE SEVERE RAMIFICATION ON MY CLIENT THAN JAIL TIME IS. IN ESSENCE, IT WOULD — TAKING ME AND SENDING ME TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY FOR THE REST OF MY LIFE — MR. HWANG HAS —

THE COURT: YOU CAN’T POSSIBLY BELIEVE THAT THIS COURT HAS ANY AUTHORITY, JURISDICTION IN ANY WAY WITH RESPECT TO HIS STATUS WITH THE IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENT. THAT’S THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. THEY HAVE THEIR OWN COURTS AND THEIR OWN SYSTEM. THEY’LL MAKE THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT HE IS DEPORTED OR NOT. THAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS COURT. THIS COURT IS HERE TO SENTENCE AN INDIVIDUAL FOR THE ACTS THAT HE COMMITTED IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR. THAT’S WHY THIS COURT IS HERE. WHAT DOES IMMIGRATION HAVE TO DO WITH IT? AND THE FACT THAT HE WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE DEPORTED, WHAT DOES THAT HAVE TO DO WITH IT?

MR. EPSTEIN: I THINK — YOU ARE ASKING MY PERSONAL OPINION?

THE COURT: NO. I AM ASKING YOUR OPINION AS A LAWYER AND A BENCH OFFICER BOUND BY THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT IN THIS STATE. THAT’S WHAT I’M ASKING YOU AS.

MR. EPSTEIN: MY POSITION IS THAT IF THE ONLY REASON — IF THIS WAS CLEARLY A STATE PRISON CASE — AND I’VE BEEN PRACTICING 31 YEARS AND I THINK I HAVE MORE THAN THE AVERAGE AMOUNT OF EXPERIENCE OF THE PEOPLE WHO PRACTICE IN THE LOS ANGELES COURTS. I LOOK AT THIS CASE AS A SERIOUS CASE. BUT I DON’T LOOK AT THIS CASE AS A MANDATORY STATE PRISON CASE. I THINK IT’S A BORDERLINE CASE. I THINK A JUDGE WOULD NOT BE FAULTED NOT TO SEND A DEFENDANT TO STATE PRISON UNDER THESE FACTS AS I HAVE DISCUSSED THEM, AND I THINK A JUDGE WOULD NOT BE FAULTED IF HE SENT HIM TO STATE PRISON. I THINK THIS IS A CHOICE BORDERLINE CASE. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A MAN WHO IS 28 YEARS OLD AND NEVER BEEN CONVICTED OF A CRIME IN HIS LIFE.

THE COURT: THAT IS A FACTOR IN MITIGATION.

MR. EPSTEIN: ALL RIGHT.

THE COURT: AS THE PROBATION OFFICER CORRECTLY REPORTED, THE ONLY FACTOR IN MITIGATION.

MR. EPSTEIN: THE PROBATION OFFICER ALSO REPORTED INCORRECTLY — AND I THINK HE SHOWS HIS BIAS IN THIS CASE, VERY HONESTLY — THAT WHEN HE MENTIONED EVEN WAY BACK WHEN WE FIRST TALKED TO MISS NA IN THIS CASE AND SHE TOLD HIM SHE DID NOT WANT THE DEFENDANT TO GO TO STATE PRISON, HE IMMEDIATELY ASSUMED AND ARGUED TO THE COURT THAT SHE WAS ONLY MAKING THE STATEMENT BECAUSE SHE WAS AFRAID OF PHYSICAL DANGER FROM MY CLIENT. THAT IS NOT THE CASE. MISS NA WILL TELL YOU THAT IS NOT THE CASE.

THE COURT: WELL, I’LL HEAR FROM HER IF SHE WANTS TO TESTIFY. SHE’S ENTITLED, AND I’LL HEAR FROM HER.

MR. EPSTEIN: RIGHT. WHAT I’M SAYING IS I THINK THE REPORT FROM THE PROBATION OFFICER CAME FROM A BIASED POSITION. TO ARGUE TO THE COURT THAT THE MOTIVATION FOR THE VICTIM ASKING FOR LENIENCY IN NOT SENDING A DEFENDANT TO STATE PRISON CAME FROM SOME SPECULATION FROM THE PROBATION OFFICER AND RELAYING THAT TO THE COURT, I THINK, TENDS TO SHOW A PROBATION OFFICER WHO IS NOT BEING OBJECTIVE. THE PROBATION OFFICER —

THE COURT: IS THERE ANYTHING YOU FOUND IN READING THE REPORT BETWEEN PAGE 2 AND 22, WHICH IS 20 PAGES OF A RECITATION OF THE FACTS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS ATTACK AND ITS SUBSEQUENT EVENTS, ANYTHING INACCURATE?

MR. EPSTEIN: I DON’T HAVE IT IN FRONT OF ME RIGHT NOW. BUT I DO RECALL, AS MISS DIERINGER POINTED OUT, THAT THE ORIGINAL POLICE REPORT HAD MY CLIENT KICKING HER A LOT MORE THAN SHE TESTIFIED TO ACTUALLY INCURRING. AS WE KNOW, POLICE OFTEN, IN TAKING REPORTS, GET THINGS INACCURATE. THEY ARE LATER CLEARED UP; SOMETIMES INACCURATE IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT, SOMETIMES INACCURATE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.

THE COURT: ACCORDING TO DEPUTY PROBATION OFFICER BRIDGE, THIS IS A STATEMENT DIRECTLY MADE TO HIM OR HER. I DON’T KNOW THE GENDER OF BRIDGE. IT DOESN’T MATTER. BUT DEPUTY PROBATION OFFICER BRIDGE REPORTS THESE AS FACTS THAT CAME DIRECTLY FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH MS. NA.

MR. EPSTEIN: I DON’T THINK THAT’S TRUE. I’M SAYING I DON’T THINK THAT’S TRUE. I THINK THE INTERVIEW HE HAD WITH MISS NA WAS — AND SHE CAN CORRECT ME IF I’M WRONG — I THINK MOST OF THESE THINGS CAME FROM READING THE POLICE REPORT. I’M NOT POSITIVE OF THAT, SO WE WOULD HAVE TO ASK MISS NA THAT. BUT I DON’T WANT THE COURT TO MISUNDERSTAND WHAT I’M SAYING. NOTHING I’M SAYING HERE TODAY IS TRYING TO SAY TO THE COURT OR TRYING TO JUSTIFY MY CLIENT’S CONDUCT. WHAT I AM SAYING IS THIS WAS A SEVERE BEATING. IT WAS NOT AS SEVERE A BEATING AS I THINK THE COURT IS UNDER THE IMPRESSION OF.

THE COURT: ANY BEATING IS SEVERE.

MR. EPSTEIN: OF COURSE, YOUR HONOR. BUT THERE ARE SEVERE BEATINGS AND THERE ARE SEVERE BEATINGS. ALL RIGHT. THIS IS A CASE, THERE WERE NO BROKEN BONES. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, THERE WERE NO FRACTURES. THERE WAS NO HOSPITALIZATION. I HAVE SEEN MISDEMEANOR CASES WHERE VICTIMS WERE HOSPITALIZED, HAD HAD MORE SEVERE INJURIES THAN IN THIS CASE. AND THAT’S NOT JUSTIFYING. PLEASE DON’T MISUNDERSTAND WHAT I’M SAYING. THAT’S NOT JUSTIFYING WHAT MY CLIENT DID. I’M SIMPLY SAYING THAT WHEN YOU ARE TRYING TO DECIDE WHETHER A 28-YEAR-OLD PERSON WITH NO PRIOR RECORD WHATSOEVER DESERVES TO GO TO STATE PRISON BASED ON THE SEVERITY OF THE BEATING; BASED ON 30 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE, I DON’T THINK THIS IS A MANDATORY STATE PRISON CASE. I’M NOT SAYING THAT THE COURT WOULD BE FAULTED —

THE COURT: I DIDN’T SAY IT WAS MANDATORY.

MR. EPSTEIN: I DON’T MEAN MANDATORY UNDER THE LAW. I MEAN MANDATORY IN THE VIEWS OF EXPERIENCED JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS. I’M SAYING THIS IS A SITUATION WHICH IS EXTREMELY SITUATIONAL. IT’S A TYPE OF SITUATION — AND AGAIN, PLEASE DON’T TAKE THIS AS JUSTIFICATION — IT’S A TYPE OF SITUATION WHERE UNDER OUR LAW WHERE PEOPLE KILL THEIR SPOUSES, OKAY, JURIES ARE ALLOWED TO TAKE —

THE COURT: I THINK THE STATISTICS SHOW THAT IT DOESN’T HAPPEN THE FIRST TIME. IT LEADS UP TO THINGS.

MR. EPSTEIN: SURE.

THE COURT: MAYBE WE CAUGHT THIS ONE BEFORE IT DID LEAD UP TO THAT WITH THE POSSESSOR OF THE 13 WEAPONS WHO IS THREATENING TO USE WEAPONS.

MR. EPSTEIN: YOUR HONOR, MY CLIENT AND THE VICTIM HAD A RELATIONSHIP FOR MANY, MANY YEARS.

THE COURT: EIGHT YEARS, AS I RECALL.

MR. EPSTEIN: THIS IS THE ONLY TIME HE EVER STRUCK HER. THIS IS NOT A CASE —

THE COURT: THIS IS THE ONLY TIME IT APPEARS SHE EVER LEFT AND TRIED TO LEAVE THE RELATIONSHIP.

MR. EPSTEIN: JUDGE, THIS IS THE ONLY TIME HE EVER STRUCK HER. THIS IS NOT A CASE OF CONTINUED ABUSE. THOSE ARE HORRENDOUS CASES. ALL THESE CASES ARE HORRENDOUS. BUT THIS IS NOT ONE OF THOSE CASES WITH A HISTORY OF A WOMAN BEING BEATEN BY SOMEONE OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS, A NUMBER OF MONTHS. THAT’S NOT THE SITUATION HERE. YOU HAVE A SITUATION HERE WHERE MY CLIENT, WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION, CLEARLY, BUT WITH SOME MITIGATION, TOTALLY LOST IT. ALL RIGHT? AND AGAIN, UNDER THE LAW, JURIES ARE INSTRUCTED THAT THEY CAN CONSIDER THESE TYPES OF SITUATIONS TO REDUCE A MURDER TO A MANSLAUGHTER. SO OUR LAW CLEARLY RECOGNIZES THESE TYPE OF SITUATIONS AS MITIGATING, NOT AS JUSTIFICATION.

THE COURT: WHAT’S THE MITIGATION? THAT’S WHAT I WANT TO HEAR. THE ONLY THING I’VE READ THAT’S MITIGATION IS HE’S FACING DEPORTATION BACK TO KOREA WHERE HE’S NEVER BEEN AND COULDN’T COPE. THAT’S ALL THAT’S IN HERE.

MR. EPSTEIN: JUDGE, THE SITUATION — I ASSUME THE COURT WAS AWARE OF UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHEN THIS BEATING TOOK PLACE. AND IF THE COURT ISN’T, PERHAPS —

THE COURT: WELL, WHAT DO YOU MEAN? IT TOOK PLACE —

MR. EPSTEIN: IT TOOK PLACE IN A SITUATION WHERE MY CLIENT —

THE COURT: FOLLOWED HER; CORRECT? STALKED HER, PERHAPS? ISN’T THAT A FACT? SHE WAS GOING — GOT INTO A RELATIONSHIP, BE IT ONE DATE OR WHATEVER, WITH ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL. HE FOLLOWED HER TO THAT INDIVIDUAL’S RESIDENCE, AND WHEN SHE LEFT THAT RESIDENCE HE BEAT THE HELL OUT OF HER? ISN’T THAT WHAT HAPPENED?

MR. EPSTEIN: WELL, I THINK THAT’S — I DON’T THINK THAT’S A TOTALLY — MY UNDERSTANDING OF IT WAS HE FOUND SOME TICKETS WHICH HAD THIS ADDRESS, A NUMBER OF PARKING TICKETS WHICH HAD THIS ADDRESS ON THEM. HE WAS CURIOUS WHY SHE WAS AT THIS ADDRESS, WENT TO THAT ADDRESS, SAW HER CAR PARKED AT THAT ADDRESS AND SAW HER INSIDE THIS APARTMENT.

THE COURT: IT’S AN ISSUE OF CONTROL, MR. EPSTEIN.

MR. EPSTEIN: ALL I’M SAYING —

THE COURT: MR. HWANG WAS LOSING CONTROL.

MR. EPSTEIN: THERE’S NO QUESTION HE WAS LOSING CONTROL IN THIS SITUATION.

THE COURT: NO. I’M TALKING ABOUT — YOU’RE TALKING ABOUT HIS TEMPERAMENT. I’M TALKING ABOUT HIS CONTROL OVER MR. NA (SIC). HE SAW THAT DISAPPEARING. HOW DID HE RESPOND FOR THE FIRST TIME IN EIGHT YEARS THAT HE SAW THAT HE WAS LOSING CONTROL OVER HER? HE BEAT HER UP.

MR. EPSTEIN: ON WHAT BASIS IS YOUR HONOR ASSUMING —

THE COURT: THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE THAT HAVE BEEN PRESENTED BEFORE ME IN THE FEW DOCUMENTS THAT I HAVE —

MR. EPSTEIN: THERE’S NO EVIDENCE HERE THAT THERE’S BEEN A CONTROL SITUATION OVER A PERIOD OF TIME PRIOR TO THIS OTHER THAN A RELATIONSHIP. WHAT EVIDENCE IS THE COURT REFERRING TO THAT SAYS MY CLIENT WAS CONTROLLING MISS NA PRIOR TO THIS SITUATION?

THE COURT: OKAY. GO AHEAD.

MR. EPSTEIN: I MEAN —

THE COURT: GO AHEAD. CLEARLY, YOU DON’T GET THE PICTURE EITHER, MR. EPSTEIN. HOW MANY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES HAVE YOU HANDLED, SIR?

MR. EPSTEIN: MANY. A LOT MORE SINCE THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE THAN I EVER DID IN THE YEARS BEFORE, CLEARLY.

THE COURT: CONTROL IS AN ISSUE. ALL RIGHT? AND IT’S AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE. AND IT’S STILL —

MR. EPSTEIN: I’M NOT SAYING THAT CONTROL IS NOT AN ISSUE. I’M SIMPLY SAYING THIS IS NOT A FACTUAL SITUATION THAT SHOWS OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME MY CLIENT WAS CONTROLLING MISS NA. THAT’S ALL I AM SAYING.

MS. DIERINGER: ALL RIGHT.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WHAT MITIGATION IS THERE FOR YOUR CLIENT WEARING BOOTS TO KICK HER, PUNCH HER, BEAT HER UP? WHAT MITIGATION IS THERE? I’M LOOKING FOR IT.

MR. EPSTEIN: JUDGE, THERE IS NEVER JUSTIFICATION. THE ONLY MITIGATION IS WHAT I’VE SAID, THAT HE WAS IN A VERY EMOTIONAL SITUATION, WHICH DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE ATTACK. BUT AS I SAID BEFORE —

THE COURT: IN OTHER WORDS, THERE IS NO MITIGATION.

MR. EPSTEIN: NO. I THINK THERE IS —

THE COURT: WELL, YOU USED THE WORD “MITIGATION.”

MR. EPSTEIN: YES.

THE COURT: I HEARD YOU SAY THE WORD “MITIGATION.”

MR. EPSTEIN: I THINK THE MITIGATION IS THE HEAT OF PASSION, THE SAME MITIGATION THAT ALLOWS A JURY TO REDUCE A MURDER TO A MANSLAUGHTER IN SITUATIONS WHERE PEOPLE ACT IN THE HEAT OF PASSION. MY CLIENT ACTED IN THE HEAT OF PASSION. HE REGRETTED THIS SINCE IT HAPPENED. I THINK CLEARLY THIS WAS HEAT-OF-PASSION SITUATION. THIS WAS NOT A SITUATION WHERE A GUY CAME HOME DRUNK, A NIGHT HOME AFTER OUT WITH THE BOYS, AND DECIDED TO BEAT UP ON HIS GIRLFRIEND AND HIS WIFE. IT WAS DONE IN THE HEAT OF PASSION IN A SITUATION WHERE WE CAN UNDERSTAND HEAT OF PASSION. THAT’S WHAT I’M SAYING TO THE COURT —

THE COURT: WELL, WHAT DID THE LEGISLATURE SAY WHEN THEY PASSED THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACTS? THOSE TYPES OF ACTS SHOULD BE PUNISHED BY IMPRISONMENT. ISN’T THAT WHAT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS?

MR. EPSTEIN: OR COUNTY JAIL. THIS IS NOT A MANDATORY STATE PRISON. THIS IS A WOBBLER. THIS IS NOT A MANDATORY STATE PRISON OFFENSE. THE COURT HAS LEGAL DISCRETION TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT A SEXUAL BATTERY CASE IS A STATE PRISON OR A COUNTY JAIL OR EVEN A NO-TIME SITUATION. I’M NOT INDICATING THAT BY ANY MEANS I THINK THIS IS A NO-TIME SITUATION.

THE COURT: THAT WAS THE DECISION OF THE PEOPLE, NOT THIS COURT, BECAUSE I DON’T KNOW WHAT ALL THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE WOULD SHOW. BUT THAT WAS THE DECISION OF THE PEOPLE, TO HAVE HIM PLEAD ONLY TO COUNTS 1 AND 7, 2 NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT.

MR. EPSTEIN: YOUR HONOR IS ASSUMING, OKAY, THAT MY 4 CLIENT WAS GUILTY OF THE COUNTS —

THE COURT: NO, SIR. I’M NOT ASSUMING ANYTHING. I’M NOT ASSUMING ANYTHING. HOW COULD I EVEN ASSUME IT? I DON’T KNOW THE FACTS.

MR. EPSTEIN: BUT YOU JUST SAID EARLIER WHEN YOU WERE TALKING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH KIDNAPPING, EXTREMELY SERIOUS OFFENSES.

THE COURT: THAT’S RIGHT. HE IS INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY. HE STILL IS.

MR. EPSTEIN: I’M SAYING ON THOSE COUNTS I BELIEVE THIS CASE WAS OVERCHARGED.

THE COURT: OKAY.

MR. EPSTEIN: OKAY. THERE IS A LOT OF EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE THAT DURING THIS TIME PERIOD —

THE COURT: SHE CONSENTED?

MR. EPSTEIN: YOUR HONOR, THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE — AND YOU CAN QUESTION MISS NA ON THIS WHEN SHE MAKES HER STATEMENT. — THAT MY CLIENT LEFT HER ALONE IN A HOTEL ROOM FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME. SHE CALLED MANY FRIENDS. SHE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO LEAVE. SHE NEVER CLAIMED SHE WAS BEING HELD AGAINST HER WILL. IN FACT, SHE NEVER CLAIMED SHE WAS SEXUALLY MOLESTED, EITHER. SHE CLAIMED SHE HAD BEEN BEATEN UP, WHICH SHE HAD BEEN. SHE TOLD HER FRIENDS, “I’VE BEEN BEATEN UP.” SHE NEVER ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE. SHE, IN FACT, CALLED THE DEFENDANT FROM THE HOTEL ROOM WHERE SHE WAS AND NEVER LEFT. SO I THINK THE CHANCES THE JURY WOULD HAVE FOUND MY CLIENT GUILTY OF KIDNAPPING ARE EXTREMELY SMALL. I DON’T THINK, IN FACT, IT WAS A KIDNAPPING. I THINK AS TO THOSE CHARGES IT WAS OVERCHARGED.

THE COURT: PERHAPS THAT’S WHY THEY GAVE THE FOUR-YEAR LID. I DON’T KNOW. DO YOU HAVE ANY WITNESSES THAT YOU WISH TO CALL?

MR. EPSTEIN: YES. I WANT — MY CLIENT WANTS TO MAKE A STATEMENT, AND I WANT TO CALL MISS NA.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET’S PROCEED.

MR. EPSTEIN: WOULD YOU LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE COURT? (DISCUSSION OFF THE RECORD BETWEEN COUNSEL AND THE DEFENDANT.)

MR. EPSTEIN: YOU CAN’T STAND WITH YOUR HANDS CUFFED UP.

THE DEFENDANT: YOUR HONOR, I JUST WANT TO APOLOGIZE TO THE COURT FOR WASTING THE COURT’S TIME. IN PARTICULAR, I WANT TO APOLOGIZE TO HELEN NA, MY EX-GIRLFRIEND. WHAT I DID WAS WRONG AND WAS UNCONSCIONABLE. IT WAS AN ACT OF A COWARD. I HOPE SOME DAY SHE COULD FORGIVE ME. WE HAD A REALLY LONG RELATIONSHIP. IT WAS A FAIRLY LOVING RELATIONSHIP FOR MOST OF THOSE TIMES. I HOPE SHE CAN REMEMBER MAYBE THE GOOD TIMES THAT WE HAD TOGETHER. I NEVER HIT HER. I NEVER CONTROLLED HER IN ANY WAY, PHYSICALLY OR VERBALLY. I JUST HOPE SHE CAN FORGIVE ME SOONER OR LATER. I KNOW IT’S NOT GOING TO HAPPEN ANYTIME SOON. THAT’S A FACT OF LIFE. SHE KNOWS I’M NOT A BAD PERSON. I JUST LOST IT THAT DAY. I DON’T KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO ME — I KNOW WHAT HAPPENED. AND I’M NOT GOING TO INTERFERE WITH HER LIFE ANY MORE WHATSOEVER. I’M NOT GOING TO TRY TO CONTACT HER IN ANY WAY, SHAPE OR FORM. I HAVEN’T. AND I JUST — I BEG THE COURT FOR MERCY, FOR LENIENCY, AT LEAST. THAT’S IT.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. ALL RIGHT. MISS NA?

MR. EPSTEIN: MS. NA.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MISS NA, YOU ARE NOT UNDER OATH. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT. IF YOU WANT TO BE UNDER OATH, I CAN DO THAT. I DON’T THINK IT’S NECESSARY. WHY DON’T YOU JUST TELL ME. AS THE VICTIM IN THIS CASE, YOU HAVE THE PERFECT RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND TELL ME EXACTLY WHAT YOUR FEELINGS ARE. I HAVE READ THE TWO-PAGE STATEMENT ON YOUR LETTERHEAD. IT’S CONTAINED AS EXHIBIT A IN MR. EPSTEIN’S PAPERS. SO I AM FAMILIAR WITH THAT. IF YOU WANT TO REPEAT IT OR ADD TO OR SUBTRACT FROM IT, YOU MAY DO SO. SO GO AHEAD. YOU CAN MAKE YOUR STATEMENT.

MS. NA: WELL, YOUR HONOR, AS A VICTIM OF THIS HEINOUS CRIME, I AM FULLY AWARE OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO ME. I UNDERSTAND WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO INKYO, AS WELL. I’M HERE ON MY OWN ACCORD, MY OWN ACCOUNT, TO DO THE RIGHT THING. I’M NOT HERE MOTIVATED, PERSUADED BY THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY, WHOM I DESPISE, BY THE WAY — NO OFFENSE. — OR BY MONEY OR BY GUILT FOR THE FACT THAT HE’S BEING DEPORTED TO KOREA.

THE COURT: BUT HE’S NOT BEING. SO LET’S GET THAT CLEAR.

MS. NA: WELL, IT’S A FACTOR.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. IT’S NOT A FACTOR. BUT GO AHEAD.

MS. NA: RIGHT. ON THE OTHER EXTREME, KNOWING THAT WITH THE FULL OPPOSITION FROM MY — FROM THE PROSECUTOR, MY THERAPIST, PSYCHIATRIST, FAMILY AND FRIENDS, I’M HERE ON MY OWN ACCORD. MY GREATEST DESIRE IS TO PUT THIS CASE BEHIND ME. AND WHAT I HAD TO ENDURE HAS BEEN VERY PAINFUL AND I’M STILL DEALING WITH THE AFTERMATH. WHAT HE DID WAS INDEED VERY WRONG. AND I DO STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT HE SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR WHAT HE DID. HOWEVER, I COULD ONLY SUPPORT A PUNISHMENT THAT WOULD BE JUST AND TO ME SEEM PRODUCTIVE RATHER THAN DESTRUCTIVE. I WAS IN A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH INKYO, SO I FEEL THAT I DO KNOW HIM QUITE WELL, ENOUGH TO SAY THAT HE HAS HAD TIME TO REFLECT ON WHAT HAS HAPPENED. AND I KNOW THAT WHAT HE DID WAS IN THE HEAT OF PASSION. I WOULDN’T BE HERE IF I FELT THAT MY LIFE WAS IN JEOPARDY OR THAT HE WOULD COME AFTER ME OR MY FAMILY OR BE IN ANY HARM’S WAY. I DO NOT FEEL THAT LONG-TERM IMPRISONMENT OR THE DEPORTATION FACTOR IS A SOLUTION TO THAT OR AN ANSWER. I FEEL THAT THE TIME HE ALREADY SPENT IN JAIL IS REASONABLE ENOUGH. I DO WANT HIM TO BE ACCOUNTABLE FOR WHAT HE DID, AND I HAVE LAID THOSE CONDITIONS IN MY CONCERNS IN THE LETTER WHICH YOU HAVE.

THE COURT: RIGHT.

MS. NA: BUT ALL IN ALL, YOU KNOW, I’M HERE BECAUSE I WANT TO PLEAD FOR MERCY AS SOMEONE WHO WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THIS, UNDERSTANDING WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO ME AND TO HIM. THANK YOU.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. NOW LET ME JUST ASK YOU A COUPLE QUESTIONS. ALL RIGHT. THE PROBATION OFFICER, IN HIS REPORT, SAYS THAT HE INTERVIEWED YOU AND GOT THE INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO THE INCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE. AND THESE TOOK PLACE OVER A COUPLE OF DAYS; CORRECT?

MS. NA: CORRECT.

THE COURT: SO IT DIDN’T ALL HAPPEN JUST ONCE; RIGHT?

MS. NA: (NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE.)

THE COURT: I DON’T KNOW IF YOU HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO READ IT — HAVE YOU HAD A CHANCE TO READ IT?

MS. NA: NOT THE PROBATION OFFICER REPORT. BUT — I UNDERSTAND —

THE COURT: OKAY.

MS. NA: I KNOW WHAT HAPPENED.

THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, WERE THERE THREATS TO YOU AND YOUR FAMILY, OR NOT? I’LL JUST MAKE IT AS BLUNT AS I CAN. IF YOU DON’T WANT TO RESPOND, THAT’S OKAY. BUT I WANT TO KNOW: IS THE PROBATION OFFICER’S REPORT CORRECT IN THAT THERE WERE THREATS TO YOU, YOUR FAMILY AND MR. BERNARDI?

MR. EPSTEIN: YOUR HONOR, MAY I ASK WHAT TIME FRAME ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT? BECAUSE THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT MY CLIENT THREATENED TO HER FAMILY ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP —

THE COURT: I’M TALKING ABOUT THREATS TO HER DIRECTLY.

MR. EPSTEIN: PHYSICAL HARM?

THE COURT: THAT’S WHAT THE FIST IMPLICATION CERTAINLY IS. WERE THERE ANY THREATS MADE TO YOU AT ALL? DID YOU GO GET A RESTRAINING ORDER?

MS. NA: YES.

THE COURT: WHAT WAS THE BASIS OF THE RESTRAINING ORDER? LET ME ASK IT ANOTHER WAY, FURTHER. WAS A RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED?

MS. NA: YES.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. SO THAT MEANS A BENCH OFFICER, AND I DON’T KNOW WHO IT WAS, SAID THAT YOU PRESENTED ENOUGH EVIDENCE THAT A RESTRAINING ORDER WAS APPROPRIATE. NOW, WERE THERE THREATS OR NOT?

MS. NA: YES.

THE COURT: THERE WERE. OKAY. SO THAT PART OF THE REPORT IS CORRECT. DID HE PUNCH YOU?

MS. NA: YES.

THE COURT: DID HE KICK YOU?

MS. NA: YES.

THE COURT: DID HE DO SOME OF THAT PUNCHING AND

KICKING WHILE YOU WERE ON THE GROUND?

MS. NA: YES.

THE COURT: WERE YOU BRUISED?

MS. NA: (NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE.)

THE COURT: IS THAT A “YES”?

MS. NA: YES.

THE COURT: OKAY. DID MR. HWANG EVER SAY — I’M ON PAGE 8, IF COUNSEL WANTS TO FOLLOW ALONG. — THAT HE WOULD KILL MR. BERNARDI AND YOUR FAMILY?

MS. NA: YES.

THE COURT: IS IT TRUE YOU DIDN’T REPORT THIS INCIDENT BECAUSE YOU FEARED HIM AND WHAT HE MIGHT DO TO YOUR FAMILY?

MR. EPSTEIN: SHE DID REPORT THE INCIDENT. I’M NOT SURE —

THE COURT: I’M JUST ASKING ABOUT THE PROBATION REPORT, MR. EPSTEIN. GO AHEAD. IS THAT TRUE?

MS. NA: YES.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT.

MS. NA: YOUR HONOR, I’M FULLY AWARE OF WHAT I SAID —

THE COURT: NO. NO. I’M JUST ASKING — ALL I NEED — AS EVERYBODY, I JUST NEED TO KNOW WHAT THE FACTS ARE. THE COURT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE DIDN’T HEAR THE TRIAL, DIDN’T SEE ANY POLICE REPORTS, JUST TO LET YOU KNOW WHY I’M ASKING THESE QUESTIONS. AND I DON’T BY ANY MEANS MEAN TO CROSS-EXAMINE YOU. I DON’T MEAN TO DO ANYTHING OTHER THAN JUST ASCERTAIN SOME FACTS. IN ORDER FOR ME TO MAKE MY DECISION, I HAVE TO KNOW AS MUCH AS I CAN ABOUT THE FACTS, MR. HWANG, ABOUT YOU, ABOUT WHAT WENT ON. ALL RIGHT? SO I DON’T HAVE POLICE REPORTS. I DON’T HAVE ACCESS TO THEM. THE ONLY INFORMATION I HAVE IS WHAT MR. EPSTEIN PROVIDED TO ME AND WHAT THE PROBATION OFFICER PROVIDED TO ME. SO THAT’S WHY I AM ASKING THE QUESTION.

MS. NA: THE PROBATION OFFICER ALSO THOUGHT I WAS UNDER DURESS OR — WHICH IS NOT THE CASE.

THE COURT: RIGHT. AND I WILL SAY RIGHT NOW IT APPEARS THAT YOU ARE HERE OF YOUR OWN VOLITION, AND I UNDERSTAND THAT, AS YOU ARE SAYING TODAY. AGAIN, I’M JUST TRYING TO GET TO THE UNDERLYING FACTS. OKAY? AND I UNDERSTAND. AND WHAT YOU SAID TO ME IN WRITING AND NOW ORALLY IS YOU FEEL HE’S BEEN PUNISHED ENOUGH AND THAT THE COURT SHOULD PUT HIM ON PROBATION AND DO THE COMMUNITY SERVICE, PAY YOU THE $21,000 IN RESTITUTION, ET CETERA, ET CETERA. I MEAN, IS THAT A FAIR ASSESSMENT OF YOUR POSITION?

MS. NA: YES.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ARE YOU STILL UNDERGOING THERAPY?

MS. NA: YES.

THE COURT: OKAY. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER YOU WANT TO SAY?

MS. NA: (NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE.)

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, MISS NA. I APPRECIATE YOUR COMING DOWN AND TESTIFYING. ALL RIGHT. ANY FURTHER WITNESSES, MR. EPSTEIN?

MR. EPSTEIN: YES. ON THE GUN SITUATION, I WANT THAT TO BE CLEAR FOR THE COURT.

THE COURT: SURE. MRS. HWANG, COME FORWARD. SHE CAN JUST STAND THERE, IF SHE WISHES.

MR. EPSTEIN: DO YOU HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE AS TO ANY OF THE GUNS AND THE LOCATION OF THE GUNS THAT YOUR SON ORIGINALLY POSSESSED THAT WERE LISTED? SHE SPEAKS SOME ENGLISH —

THE COURT: SO IS COUNSEL ACTING AS INTERPRETER?

MR. MIM: YES.

MS. HWANG (INTERPRETED BY MR. MIM): IF YOU CAN ASK ME MORE PRECISELY ABOUT THE GUNS, I’LL TRY TO ANSWER.

MR. EPSTEIN: WERE YOU INVOLVED IN CHANGING TITLE OR GETTING RID OF ANY OF THE GUNS THAT YOUR SON POSSESSED BEFORE HIS ARREST?

MS. HWANG (INTERPRETED BY MR. MIM): MY HUSBAND DID.

MR. EPSTEIN: DO YOU KNOW WHAT YOUR HUSBAND DID?

MS. HWANG (INTERPRETED BY MR. MIM): HE CHANGED NAMES ON THREE GUNS TO HIS.

MR. EPSTEIN: TO YOUR HUSBAND’S NAME?

MS. HWANG (INTERPRETED BY MR. MIM): YES.

MR. EPSTEIN: DO YOU AND YOUR HUSBAND RUN A MARKET?

MS. HWANG: (INAUDIBLE.) THE REPORTER: I CAN’T HEAR, YOUR HONOR.

MR. MIM: SHE SAID, “WE LEFT THREE, BUT THAT WAS NOT WHAT HE ASKED FOR.”

MS. HWANG (INTERPRETED BY MR. MIM): I HAVE THREE GUNS AT THE BUSINESS PLACE.

MR. EPSTEIN: IS YOUR BUSINESS IN COMPTON?

MS. HWANG (IN ENGLISH): UH-HUH.

MR. EPSTEIN: HAS THAT MARKET BEEN ROBBED?

MS. HWANG: (INAUDIBLE.)

THE REPORTER: YOUR HONOR, I CAN’T MAKE A RECORD OUT OF THIS.

THE COURT: YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE TO SPEAK UP, OR WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO USE THE MICROPHONE BECAUSE THE REPORTER CANNOT HEAR WHAT IS GOING ON.

MR. MIM: YOUR HONOR?

THE COURT: YES.

MR. MIM: CAN I MOVE OVER HERE?

THE COURT: YES, SURE, SURE.

MR. EPSTEIN: DID YOUR HUSBAND CHANGE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE GUNS FROM YOUR SON TO YOUR HUSBAND?

MS. HWANG: (NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE.)

THE REPORTER: I CAN’T HEAR. I CAN’T REPORT WHAT I CAN’T HEAR.

MS. HWANG (IN ENGLISH): WE CHANGED ALREADY FROM MY SON TO MY HUSBAND, DID LIKE FIVE WEEKS AGO.

MR. EPSTEIN: AND WHEN YOU SAY YOU CHANGED, WAS THAT LEGAL TITLE, LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF THE GUNS WITH THE —

MS. HWANG: (IN ENGLISH): YES.

MR. EPSTEIN: — WITH THE AUTHORITIES?

MS. HWANG (IN ENGLISH): I ALREADY COPY, THREE COPY, GAVE IT TO MR. BROWN, PROBATION.

MR. EPSTEIN: DO YOU HAVE THOSE? TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE — OBVIOUSLY, YOUR SON IS IN CUSTODY NOW. BUT ARE THERE ANY OTHER GUNS THAT YOUR SON POSSESSED AT ONE TIME THAT ARE STILL AROUND ANYWHERE?

MS. HWANG (IN ENGLISH): WE DON’T HAVE ANY MORE, ONLY EXCEPT ONE SHOTGUN, BUT MR. LARA (PH.) RETURNED TO MANHATTAN BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT.

MR. EPSTEIN: THANK YOU. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE MR. HWANG —

THE COURT: SURE. GO AHEAD.

MR. EPSTEIN: COULD YOU TELL THE COURT WHAT YOU DID WITH THE OTHER GUNS.

THE DEFENDANT: THEY’VE BEEN SOLD OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS TO AN ARMORY, COLLECTORS’ ARMORY, IN CULVER CITY.

MR. EPSTEIN: WHAT’S THE NAME OF THAT ESTABLISHMENT?

THE DEFENDANT: COLLECTORS’ ARMORY.

MR. EPSTEIN: DO YOU STILL HAVE ANY — OTHER THAN THE THREE WEAPONS THAT YOUR MOTHER HAS CHANGED TITLE TO INTO YOUR FATHER’S NAME, DO YOU HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE WHATSOEVER AS TO THE WHEREABOUTS OF ANY OTHER GUNS THAT YOU ONCE POSSESSED BEFORE YOU WERE ARRESTED?

THE DEFENDANT: I HAVE NO MORE GUNS. THAT’S IT.

THE COURT: IT’S NOT CONTAINED IN PART OF THE TAHL WAIVERS. WHAT WAS THE AGREEMENT? OR WAS THIS PURSUANT 20 TO RESTRAINING ORDER?

MS. DIERINGER: PURSUANT TO THE RESTRAINING ORDER. AND ALSO MENTIONED AS PART OF THE PLEA, THE DEFENDANT WASTO TURN IN AND SURRENDER ALL HIS WEAPONS, NOT SELL THEM OR PUT THEM IN OTHER PEOPLE’S NAMES. IT WAS TO BE SURRENDERED TO THE POLICE DEPARTMENT SO THEY COULD BE DESTROYED AND NOT BE IN EXISTENCE SO THAT — AND AGAIN, GOING THROUGH THE PAPERWORK, THE COMPUTER PRINTOUTS ON THESE GUNS IS CONFUSING. SOMETIMES — THEY MENTION EVERY HISTORY FOR WHEN THE GUN WAS TRANSFERRED, AND SO MR. INKYO’S NAME IS ON ALL OF THE GUNS. BUT THEN SOME OF THEM SHOW TRANSFERS. OTHERS DO NOT. THERE’S SIX GUNS FOR WHICH — AND THIS WAS RUN ON 12-8 OF ’97. THERE ARE SIX GUNS STILL LEFT OUTSTANDING THAT HAVE NOT SHOWN ANY TRANSFERS, ONLY ONE OF WHICH HAS BEEN TURNED INTO MANHATTAN BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT. SO — AND MOST OF THE OTHER ONES APPEAR TO BE PISTOLS, HANDGUNS. THE ONLY ONE THAT WAS NOT A HANDGUN WAS THE SHOTGUN. AND AGAIN, THAT WAS A CUT-DOWN VERSION OF A SHOTGUN. IT WAS BARELY WITHIN THE LEGAL LIMIT.

MR. EPSTEIN: YOUR HONOR, MY CLIENT IS WILLING TO MAKE THE SAME STATEMENT HE JUST MADE UNDER OATH, SUBJECT TO THE SANCTIONS OF PERJURY.

THE COURT: IT’S NOT NECESSARY. THAT’S — IT’S NOT PART OF THE TAHL WAIVER. IT SEEMS TO BE SOME SIDE AGREEMENT THAT I’M NOT AWARE OF. IT’S NOT PART OF THE SENTENCING.

MS. DIERINGER: IT WASN’T MENTIONED IN THE TAHL WAIVER. IT WAS MENTIONED ON THE RECORD. WE DID DISCUSS IT.

THE COURT: RIGHT.

MS. DIERINGER: I DO ALSO HAVE A COPY, YOUR HONOR, OF THE RESTRAINING ORDER AND THE BASIS FOR IT WHICH CONTAINS A TYPEWRITTEN STATEMENT BY THE VICTIM, WHICH WAS THE BASIS FOR THE RESTRAINING ORDER.

THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. NOW, LET’S GET TO THE SENTENCING. I ASSUME THERE ARE NO FURTHER WITNESSES?

MR. EPSTEIN: NO, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. DO THE PEOPLE HAVE ANY REBUTTAL ARGUMENT?

MS. DIERINGER: NO, YOUR HONOR. BASICALLY, THE ONLY OTHER THING I WOULD MENTION TO THE COURT, IF THE COURT WANTS TO LOOK AT THE RESTRAINING ORDER, WE HAVE THAT, WITH A WHOLE STATEMENT BY MISS NA IN THERE. AND IN ADDITION, I WOULD POINT OUT TO THE COURT THAT MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT NO PAYMENTS OR RESTITUTION HAVE BEEN MADE HERETOFORE TO THE VICTIM. BUT OBVIOUSLY, QUITE A BIT OF MONEY HAS BEEN EXPENDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF —

THE COURT: ARE THE PEOPLE STIPULATING WITH THE DEFENSE TO THE AMOUNT OF THE RESTITUTION AT $21,858.78? I’VE HEARD NOTHING TO CONTEST THAT FIGURE. I’VE GOT IT IN A DECLARATION OF MS. NA. I NOW HAVE THE FIGURES BEFORE ME. IS THERE ANY CONTEST WITH RESPECT TO THAT?

MR. EPSTEIN: NO, YOUR HONOR. YOUR HONOR, THE FAMILY ARE READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT PAYMENTS TO MS. NA. THE ONLY REASON IT WAS NOT DONE ALREADY, OKAY, IS WE DID NOT WANT THE COURT TO MISCONSTRUE PAYING MISS NA HER RESTITUTION AT THIS POINT AS SOME ATTEMPT TO BUY HER TESTIMONY HERE IN THIS COURT PROCEEDING. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THAT. WE DIDN’T TELL THAT TO MISS NA. BUT THE FAMILY HAS ALREADY RAISED SIGNIFICANT MONEY. THEY DON’T HAVE THE FULL $21,000. BUT I WOULD HAVE TO ASK MRS. HWANG. IT IS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF MONEY. A LOT OF THIS RESTITUTION IS FORESEEN FOR THE FUTURE. I THINK ALL THE PRESENT OUTLAY IS READY TO BE PAID TO MISS NA. AGAIN, WE DID NOT DO SO BECAUSE I DID NOT WANT THE COURT TO MISCONSTRUE THE REASON FOR THAT RESTITUTION.

THE COURT: OKAY. DEFENDANT WAIVES ARRAIGNMENT FOR JUDGMENT AND FOR SENTENCING?

MR. EPSTEIN: YES, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: ANY LEGAL CAUSE WHY SENTENCE SHOULD NOT BE NOW BE IMPOSED?

MR. EPSTEIN: NO, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: AGAIN, THE COURT HAS READ AND CONSIDERED BOTH AND GIVEN ITS OBVIOUSLY CLEAR OPINION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM AND THE HISTORY WITH ATTACHMENTS. BUT I’VE READ AND CONSIDERED EVERY ONE OF THOSE DOCUMENTS. I’VE ALSO READ AND CONSIDERED DEPUTY PROBATION OFFICER BRIDGE’S REPORT, AND THE COURT WILL SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS, AND THEN JUST MAKE ONE FINAL BRIEF STATEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THIS ISSUE OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:

NUMBER ONE: THE SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS AS OUTLINED BY DEPUTY PROBATION OFFICER BRIDGE. AND I AGREE WITH THEM IN ITS ENTIRETY. UNDER CALIFORNIA RULE OF COURT 421, THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN AGGRAVATION ARE, NUMBER ONE, THAT THE CRIME INVOLVED GREAT VIOLENCE, BROUGHT GREAT BODILY HARM, THREAT OF GREAT BODILY HARM OR ANOTHER ACT DISCLOSING A HIGH DEGREE OF CRUELTY, VICIOUSNESS OR CALLOUSNESS.

NUMBER TWO: THE VICTIM WAS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE.

NUMBER THREE: THE PLANNING, SOPHISTICATION AND PROFESSIONALISM WITH WHICH THE CRIMES WERE CARRIED OUT, OR OTHER FACTS INDICATE PREMEDITATION.

NUMBER FOUR: THE DEFENDANT HAS ENGAGED IN VIOLENT CONDUCT WHICH INDICATES A DANGER TO SOCIETY UNDER CALIFORNIA RULE OF COURT 423. THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN MITIGATION ARE THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS A SHORT ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORD.

MR. EPSTEIN: VERY SHORT. IT’S NIL.

THE COURT: I’M JUST READING FROM THE REPORT. ALL RIGHT. I BELIEVE THERE WAS — AND I’LL DOUBLE-CHECK — THERE CERTAINLY WAS NOTHING SERIOUS IN THAT. THAT’S THE LANGUAGE OF 423. IN OTHER WORDS, THE MITIGATION IS THAT HE’S NOT BEEN IN ANY TROUBLE PRIOR.

MR. EPSTEIN: THAT THIS WAS, IN EFFECT, OF THE HEAT OF PASSION —

THE COURT: THAT’S NOT THE CRITERIA UNDER 423. NOW, THE RECOMMENDATION IS HIGH-BASE TERM. THAT’S EXACTLY WHAT THE COURT IS GOING TO IMPOSE. FOR COUNT 1, VIOLATION OF PENAL CODE SECTION 245(A)(1), BASED UPON THE FOUR FACTORS IN AGGRAVATION AND THE ONE FACTOR IN MITIGATION, THE COURT CHOOSES THE HIGH TERM OF FOUR YEARS. THE DEFENDANT WILL BE SENTENCED TO FOUR YEARS IN STATE PRISON. AND THAT WILL BE THE BASE TERM. WITH RESPECT TO COUNT, THAT IS THE VIOLATION OF PENAL CODE SECTION 243 — AGAIN, IT’S NOT EVEN ON HERE, SO I HAVE TO DOUBLE-CHECK. IT’S 243.4(C). THAT’S THE AMENDED ADDITIONAL COUNT. THAT, THE COURT WILL SELECT ONE THIRD TO MID TERM, WHICH IS ONE YEAR. IT’S A THREE-YEAR MID TERM, ONE THIRD THE MID TERM OF ONE YEAR.

HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE PLEA NEGOTIATION IN THIS CASE, A FOUR-YEAR LID, I’M GOING TO RUN THAT CONCURRENT. SO THAT WILL BE A TOTAL OF FOUR YEARS STATE PRISON. IN ADDITION TO THAT, THE COURT WILL IMPOSE, PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE SECTION 1202.4, THE RESTITUTION TO THE VICTIM, MS. NA. MR. HWANG WILL PAY $21,858.78 IN RESTITUTION. ALSO, THE COURT WILL IMPOSE A $10,000 FINE UNDER PENAL CODE SECTION 1202.4.

NOW, LET ME JUST AGAIN — JUST TO MAKE SURE YOU UNDERSTAND EXACTLY WHERE THE COURT IS COMING FROM, NOT THAT YOU DON’T ALREADY, I’M GOING TO QUOTE THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT. WHEN THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ENACTED THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT, WHICH IS PENAL CODE 20 SECTIONS 13700 THROUGH 13731, IT STATED A CLEAR LEGISLATIVE INTENT. THIS IS THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT, QUOTE: “TO ADDRESS DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A SERIOUS CRIME AGAINST SOCIETY AND TO ASSURE THE VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE THE MAXIMUM PROTECTION FROM ABUSE WHICH THE LAW AND THOSE WHO ENFORCE THE LAW CAN PROVIDE.” CLOSE QUOTE.

IT EMPHASIZED THAT, QUOTE: “THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHALL STRESS THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAWS TO PROTECT THE VICTIM AND SHALL COMMUNICATE THE ATTITUDE THAT VIOLENT BEHAVIOR IN THE HOME IS CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AND WILL NOT BE TOLERATED,” CLOSE QUOTE.

THIS IS THE LEGISLATURE SPEAKING. FURTHER, IT SAYS, AND AGAIN, A QUOTE — AND OBVIOUSLY, I PICKED THESE QUOTES OUT OF THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT: “DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IS A COMPLEX PROBLEM AFFECTING FAMILIES FROM ALL SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND.”

THESE CONSIDERATIONS WERE ALSO EVIDENCED IN THE LEGISLATURE’S INTENT WHEN IT ENACTED THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CENTER ACT, WHICH IS WELFARE & INSTITUTIONS SECTION 18.290: “VICTIMS FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COME FROM ALL SOCIAL, ECONOMIC CLASSES AND ETHNIC GROUPS.”

THIS IS A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE AND IT, AGAIN, IS REPUGNANT TO COME TO THIS COURT WITH THIS KIND OF DEFENSE. ACCORDINGLY, THAT IS THE SENTENCE. HE IS REMANDED FORTHWITH.

You Might Also Like